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Abstrak 
Paper ini mencoba mengkaji tumbuh kembangnya Perda (Peraturan 
Daerah) Syatiat Islam di Indonesia masa kini. Sebagaimana kita ketahui, se.Jak 
lengsernya Presiden Soeharto (1998), gerakan muslim politik menemukan 
momentumnya untuk tampil dalam panggung politik nasional. Dari tahun 1999-
2002, tiga partai Islam (PPP, PBB, dan PK) berusaha keras memperjuangkan 
masuknya kembali tujuh kata Piagam Jakarta dalam amandemen UUD 1945. 
Mereka secara intensif be1juang dari dalam parlemen. Pada waktu yang sama, 
usaha mereka juga didukung penuh oleh kelompok Islam radikal dan· luar 
parlemen seperti HTI dan MMI. Jika sebelumnya mereka menuntut penerapan 
.ryariah di level nasional, saat ini mereka berusaha melakukannya di level daerah. 
Ini terbukti dati adanya penerapan perda .ryariah di beberapa wilayah yang 
mayoritas penduduknya muslim seperti Bulukumba, Gowa, Maros, umbok, 
Pamekasan, Cian.Jur, Indramayu, Tasikmalaya, Padang, Ba'!/armasin, dan 
Nanggro Aceh Darussalam. Kajian ini mencoba membandingkan dua provinsi 
yang mayoritas penduduknya muslim, yaitu Sulawesi S elatan dan J awa Bara! 
yang sudah menerapkan perda .ryatiah sejak tahun 2001. 
Kata Kunci: politik muslim, DI/TII, KPPSI, NII, Perda Syariah. 
Abstract 
This paper will examine the rise of perda .ryari'ah (.ryari'ah regional 
regulations) in contemporary Indonesia. Since the fall of Soeharto, the muslim 
politics has reeme7,ed in the national politics constellation. From 1999 to 2002 
three Islamic political parties (PPP, PBB, and PK) insisted on proposing to 
reinsert the seven words of the Jakarta Charter into the amendment of 194 5 
Constitution. Thry intensive!} strived for them through the inside of parliament. In 
the same time, their efforts were also jttl/y supported fry the Islamic radicalism 
07,aniZf,ltion jrom the outside building such as HTI (Uberation Parry) and MMI 
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(Council of Indonesian Jihad Fighters). lf they previous/y insisted to implement 
.ryari'ah in state level, now they attempted to have it from a local region. This can 
be wi.tnessed from the application of .ryari'ah regional regulation (perda .ryari'ah) in 
some Muslim-majority distrids such as Bulukumba, Gowa, Maros, umbok, 
Pamekasan, Cianjur, Indramqyu, Tasikmalaya, Padang, Baf!Jarmasin, and 
Nanggro Aceh Darussalam. This stucfy tries to compare two Muslim m'!Jority 
provinces (South Sulawesi and West Java) which have applied perda .ryari'ah since 
2001. 
Key words: muslim politics, DI/TI!, KPPSI, NII, .ryari'ah regional regulation 
Introduction 
After the Muslim politicians had repeatedly failed to revive the 
Jakarta Charter on the national level, they currently appear to be using 
another way to formalize .ryari'ah laws: by fighting for it on the local 
level. Presumably, this shift is what Oliver Roy called 'Islamisation 
from the bottom up.'1 Concerning this issue, there are 52 districts 
which have been implementing SRRs (Sharia Regional Regulations) in 
Indonesia, all of them districts/municipalities with a Muslim majority 
such as Maros, Bulukumba, Gowa, Cianjur, Garut, Indramayu, Banjar, 
Pamekasan, and Padang.2 Needless to say, the rise of this 
phenomenon has been triggered by the shift in Indonesia's political 
legal system which has changed drastically from a centralized to a 
decentralized system. 
Since this era, there have been a number of local leaders who 
established .ryari'ah regulations and reclaimed their local identity.3 They
officially utilize the Local Autonomy Laws (UU no. 22/1999, later on 
revised by UU no. 32/2004) in supporting their political interests. This 
paper will elaborate on the application of .ryari'ah laws in two provinces 
with a Muslim majority; South Sulawesi and West Java. Both of these 
regions are known as 'the core supporters' of Islamic political parties 
and the strongholds of the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) 
movement in the 1950s.4 This indicates that the Islamic sentiments in 
both regions are similar, although they are different to some extent. In 
recent years, they have been classified as provinces that rank just 
below Aceh in formalizing .ryari'ah inspired laws. It is interesting to 
investigate who the actors involved in supporting these enactments 
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were, their motivations, and whether they have historical links to t.½e 
former Islamic movements (DI/TII) of the 1950s. I will first describe 
the application of .ryarf'ah-influenced regulations in South Sulawesi, 
followed by the West Java province. 
Analysis of the Rise of Syari'ah Regulations in South Sulawesi 
South Sulawesi is the province in Eastern Indonesia with the 
second highest number of districts which adopted .ryan'ah laws. It is 
comprised of 24 local districts/municipalities, and all of them are 
dominated by Muslim people except the Tana Toraja district.5 The 
province calls itself Serambi Madinah (Medina Veranda), since the 
majority of its inhabitants are devout Muslims. 
Like Aceh and West Java, this region has always been 'core 
area' of supporters for formalist Muslim groups. To discuss the issue 
of reviving the Jakarta Charter in the post-Soeharto era, the "l:orum 
Ukhuwah Islam (FUI, Islamic Brotherhood Forum) leaders of South 
Sulawesi met on 21 May 2000 in Bosowa Makassar Hotel. They 
discussed establishing the .ryan'ah in the S erambi Madinah and agreed to 
immediately hold Kongres Umat Islam (KUI, Islamic Community 
Congress). The first congress took place for three days, on 19-21 
October 2000 in Asrama Haji Sudikalang, Makassar.6 It resulted in the 
Deklarasi Makassar of 23 Rajab 1421 H (21 October 2000 M) which 
states: 
We, the Muslims of South Sulawesi, through Kongress Umat 
Islam, in the name of the Holy God, state that Muslims are 
ready to implement the Syarfah in South Sulawesi. Everything 
concerning the mechanism of the syari'ah application would 
be attempted immediately and constitutionally [my 
translation).7 
The first KUI congress was held two months before the first 
congress of the Maje/is Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Council of 
Indonesian Jihad Fighters), in August 2000. It is important to note 
that both congresses seemed to be closely interlinked. They had the 
same goals concerning the implementation of .ryan-'ah laws and they 
also had similar members.8 However, this topic will be investigated 
further in the next section. 
Returning to the first KUI congress, this meeting saw the 
successful formation of a .ryan'ah committee, Komite Persiapan Penegakan 
Syari'at Islam (K.PPSI, the Preparatory Committee for the 
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Implementation of Islamic Law), which functioned to strive for the 
application of syari'ah laws in all districts of this province. This 
committee was established as an alliance of religious scholars, youth 
activists, and intellectuals in South Sulawesi. Some of them were 
Tamsil Llnrung (HMI), A.M. Fatwa (PAN), H.M. Yusuf Kalla 
(Golkar), K.H. Djamaluddin Amien (the Head of Muhammadiyah), 
Prof. Dr. Anwar Arifin (Golkar), Arsyad Pana (PPP), K.H.M. Sanusi 
Basa, L.c. (Rais Syuriah of PW.NU), K.H. Farid Wajdie, M.A. (the 
Head of PB. DDI), Prof. Dr. Ahmad Ali (the UNHAS lecturer), and 
Prof. Dr. Muin Salim (the former Rector of IAIN Alaudin).9 
With the support of these prominent figures, KPPSI rapidly 
proliferated in South Sulawesi. In six months, it was present in all 
districts of South Sulawesi except for Tana Toraja and Sinjai, which 
were considered politically non-conducive districts.10 The rapid
establishment of this organization is seen as a normal phenomenon 
since the majority of the South Sulawesi people religiously honour and 
are obedient to public figures. Based on Andy Ramly's interview,11 
when KPPSI founded their branches in certain 
districts/municipalities, a number of local people did not understand 
KPPSI's agenda, which was to establish syari'ah in the province. Some 
even thought that KPPSI was a new political party, or part of it. 
The KPPSI was pioneered by three Muslim activists from 
South Sulawesi who had joined in the FUI organisation, 12 Aziz Qahhar
Muzakkar, Aswar Hasan and Agus Dwikarna. These three Muslim 
activists are quite popular among Islamic leaders in South Sulawesi. 
Therefore it is not surprising that when they proposed the idea of 
formalizing the syari'ah, the local 'ulamd' (religious scholars) and 
politicians responded positively. Moreover, it was also in accordance 
with the heated discussion about the regional autonomy law in the 
Jakarta parliament. 
Regarding this issue, in order to realise their political goal, 
KPPSI called for a special autonomy for South Sulawesi via Deklarasi 
Muharam,13 which was launched on 15 April 2001 at the al-Markaz al­
Islami Mosque in Makassar. A week after the declaration, on 23 April 
2001, KPPSI succeeded in convincing the DPRD of South Sulawesi 
province of issuing a political recommendation dealing with the 
syari'ah regulations. The recommendation was signed by the chairman 
and vice-chairman of DPRD, and all the chairmen of the political 
fractions in DPRD in province such as FPG (Golkar), F-PP (PPP), 
FPDI-P, FKK (Kesatuan Kebangsaan), F AU (Amanat Umat), and 
,\LQALAM 4 Vol. 28 No. 1 Qanuari-i\pril) 2011 
TNI/Polri. In addition, it was sent to the President and the chairman 
of the DPR RI in the form of letter no. 160/309/DPRD/2001.14, 
At the end of December 2001, the second KUI congress was 
held from the 29th to the 31st at Asrama Haji Sudiang, Makassar. It
was only one year after the previous congress. The main target of this 
congress was the establishment of 'Rumah Politzk' in the form of 
special autonomy as a legal umbrella for the application of SRRs in all 
districts/municipalities of South Sulawesi. During this congress 
KPPSI demanded the local government, the DPRD (the Regional 
People's Representative Council), and DPR RI (the National People's 
Representative Council) to issue a special autonomy law for the South 
Sulawesi province.15 If their aspirations would not be accommodated,
the congress would decide to take a 'Referendum' step, between 
special autonomy and independence. 16 
This menacing demand was inspired by the precedent of Aceh, 
which has already obtained special autonomy for the application of 
.ryati'ah laws. As declared in the first KUI congress 'the existence of 
UU no.44/1999 about the special status for Aceh,17 which gives 
authority to Aceh to implement .ryati'ah Islam, is proof that UUD 45 
has not closed the opportunity to adopt .ryati'ah laws in this country.' 
However, the KPPSI's struggle has been cut short by the bomb blast 
which occurred on the second day of the congress (30 December 
2001). Five months later, on 13 May 2002, three members of the 
KPPSI organization were arrested in the Philippines at the Ninoy 
Aquino International Airport in Manila, because they were allegedly 
carrying explosives (C4) and bomb devices in their luggage. They were 
Tamsil Linrung (a member of Mqjelis Syuro of KPPSI), Agus Dwikarna 
(the Head of Laskar Jundullah), and Abdul Jamal Balfas (a 
businessman).18 Tamsil and Jamal were later released but Dwikarna 
was sentenced to jail for ten years and one month.19 
The Connection between KPPSI and DI Movements 
The possible connection between the KPPSI and the former 
DI movement is a concern for many people. DI was an insurgence 
movement, which turned away from the central government's policy 
and proclaimed the NII (Indonesian Islamic State). Basically, it was a 
regional movement which was primary led by local strongmen. In the 
beginning, it was operated in West Java under the leadership of 
Soekarmadji Kartosoewirjo. However, after three years, it expanded 
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extensively into regions outside of Java with a Muslim majority such as 
Aceh and South Sulawesi. 
Based on a testimony from someone who fought alongside 
Lieutenant Colonel Kahar Muzakar211 in the 1950s, a number of 
districts such as Sinjai, Pinrang, Palopo, Takelar, Bulukumba, and 
Engrekang became 'de facto territories of the Darul Islam' where no 
Republican Army soldier dared venture.21 Besides armed conflict with 
the central government, Kahar Muzakkar also fought for the 
application of Islamic .ryari'ah in these territories. Historically, this 
means that the efforts to establish .ryari'ah have been taking place for a 
long time in South Sulawesi. With thousands of guerrilla troops 
headquartered in the South Sulawesi forests and mountains,22 he 
rebelled to separate from NKRI (the Unitary of Republic Indonesia) 
and intended to establish an Indonesian Islamic State (NII) like 
Kartosoewijo dreamt of in West Java.2., 
His political movement managed to upset the Indonesian 
political stability. Consequently, the central government held a military 
operation and formed Operasi Ki/at, led by Commander 
XVI/Hasanuddin, Brigadier General Andi Muhammad Yusuf. In this 
operation, Corporal Sadeli from the Siliwangi Division successfully 
shot Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Kahar Muzakkar dead at Lasalo River, 
Bonepute-Southeast Sulawesi on 2 April 1965, which was followed by 
the dissolution of the DI/NII movement in the same year.24 
Recently, the .ryari'ah· movement has been revived in South 
Sulawesi. They are associated with the KPPSI allegiance. This new 
movement is led by Aziz Qahhar Muzakkar, the son of Abdul Kahar 
Muzakar, who has declared explicitly that his movement will always 
work in a democratic way. I think that Aziz's blood lineage and the 
engagement of certain KPPSI members with the former DI is the 
reason why KPPSI has been seen as the reincarnation of the DI 
movement.25 There was even a participant from the first KUI congress 
who openly stated in the forum that KPPSI is a reincarnation of the 
movement that was led by Kahar Muzakkar.26 
However, Aziz Kahar Muzakar, who has been a key figure in 
the movement and is currently the Deputy Chair of the DPD 
representing South Sulawesi (2004-2009), explicitly denied a link 
between KPSSI and the DI movement. Buhari, Aziz Kahar Muzakar's 
older brother who is currently a member of DPRD from the PAN 
political party, stated something similar, that 'there is no connection 
between the missions of KPPSI for .ryari'ah under Aziz Kahar 
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Muzakkar and the struggle of his father in the DI/TII movement.'27 
Nonetheless, their statements become more ambivalent when cross­
checked with one of the points that is written in the official decree of 
the second KUI congress, namely: 
DI/TII is under the leadership of Colonel Abdul Kahar 
Muzakkar, from South Sulawesi, who has berjihad (fought) to 
reapply Islamic [Jari'ah as a stance of resistance to the removal 
of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter and also against the 
communist influence in South Sulawesi in 19 51 [my 
translation]. 28 
The text above explicitly states that Kahar Muzakar was a 
jihadist (holly warrior) who struggled for the establishment of the 
[Jari'ah, not an insurgent like many people believed all this time. 
Indeed, the figure of Kahar Muzakar has a strong influence in South 
Sulawesi society. There are many people who consider him still alive, 
and more than few have claimed to be Abdul Kahar Muzakkar. This is 
due to the tendency in South Sulawesi culture to relate everything to 
magic. They believe that most famous local figures in Makassar have 
bulletproof and sword-proof talismans, including Kahar Muzakar. 
Borrowing David A. Locher's theory,29the KPPSI can be 
categorized as a social movement. First, it is not merely a spontaneous 
movement; it is formally organized. This can be concluded from the 
Declaration document of the KUI congress and KPPSI's political acts. 
Second, its strategies to implement the [Jari'ah are deliberately planned 
and conducted in a democratic way. The movement engages many 
Islamic groups ranging from ulama, to intellectuals, communities, and 
political elites. Third is the issue of endurance. Though KPPSI's long 
term political targets are still uncertain, as the formalisation of ryari'ah 
had once been applied during the DI/TII period in South Sulawesi, 
and even before Indonesia's independence, like the implementation of 
ryari'ah law in the Gowa Kingdom, but KPPSI frequently uses this 
historical reason to legitimate their political goal. They fundamentally 
believe that the moral vices of society can be immediately remedied by 
applying [Jari'ah laws.30 
It is not easy to investigate the connection between the KPPSI 
and the history of DI because the ryan-'ah movements in this province 
are part of a dynamic historical process. Politically, KPPSI has a 
different paradigm than DI in establishing [Jari'ah in South Sulawesi. 
DI used uncooperative ways to resist the secular system (democracy), 
whereas KPPSI formally uses democratic ways.31 However, it cannot 
SYi\RI'AI-I MOVEMENTS IN 
COMPi\Ri\S10: SOUTH SUI ,i\ w1;:s1 
,\ND WEST J,\ \',\ PROVINCE
7 MfM,\D ,\NFi\SUL Mi\ROM 
be denied that some members of the KPPSI used to be involved in 
the DI movement. In fact, it has a close ties to the MMI which clearly 
has a connection with DI. To sum it up, institutionally this movement 
does not have a connection with DI/TU, but politico-historically, the 
influence of the DI on this organisation cannot be denied because 
many former members of the DI are involved in the KPPSI. 
Factors Driving the Mushrooming of SRRs 
There are three factors that support the spread of these 
regulations. The first is the political context; since the end of the New 
Order the public space for Muslim politics, ranging from the radical to 
the liberal, is no longer banned by state. This openness of the political 
sphere increased the number of political contestants in the country, 
and along with it the ryari'ah regulations in the provinces. It is also 
important to note that the ryari'ah movement 'from the bottom up' is 
triggered in large part by the Regional Autonomy Law; that is why the 
KPPSI demanded the application of a special autonomy status for the 
implementation of ryari'ah laws in the South Sulawesi province?2 
Moreover, before every Pifkada (local election) there are many 
political leaders favouring the enactment of SRRs to prove their 
Islamic credentials, especially the candidates coming from Nationalist 
parties like Golkar and PDI-P. In many cases these Bupati car;didates 
do not have an Islamist political agenda. They simply campaign based 
on what they think are popular regulations.33 Indeed, in many areas 
that have a strong Islamic sentiment or former DI strongholds such as 
Sinjai, Maros and Bulukumba, these political circumstances are a 
promising chance for Muslim politics to infuse their political goal. 
The second factor is the historical roots of Islam. In the 
seventeenth century, Islam played a political role in South Sulawesi 
when the king of Gowa officially converted to Islam in 1605.
34 As a 
result, Islam became the official religion of the kingdom and the 
people were obliged to embrace Islam to show their loyalty to the 
king.35 According to Anthony Reid, the Islamisation process involved 
three 'ufamd' from Minangkabau; Dato Ri Bandang, Dato Ri Patimang, 
and Dato Ri Tiro.36 The diffusion started in several small kingdoms 
of South Sulawesi such as Tanete, Bantaeng, Bulukumba, Jenneponto, 
Selayar and Mandar. In these small kingdoms, Islamisation happened 
peacefully because they fell under the authority of the king of Gowa. 
However, it came to warfare when the religion was transmitted to the 
Bugis kingdoms such as Luwu, Bone, Wajo, Soppeng and Rappang, 
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because they were the largest kingdoms in South Sulawesi. However, 
in the end they embraced Islam as well.3 7 
Another issue was when Kahar Muzakkar officially declared 
himself to be part of Kartosuwrijo's DI movement on 7 August 1953. 
As has been discussed before, apart from rebelling against the central 
government, Kahar Muzakkar also adopted the !Jari'ah laws in the 
territories under his authority. This is known through various 
documents published by Darn/ Islam in South Sulawesi, such as the 
Catatan Batin (spiritual note), Program Politik Islam Revolusioner 
(Programme for Revolutionary Islamic Politics), and the Piagam 
Makalua (Makalua Charter).38 
The third factor is the local culture, the cultural norm known 
in South Sulawesi society as panngademng (Bugis) or panngadakang 
(Makassar).39 This norm of conduct is comprised of five elements: a) 
ade' tana, a tradition which is related to political power; b) wicara, a 
concept which more or less deals with the justice system like 
procedural law in national positive law; c) rapang, which serves to 
preserve the continuity of unwritten laws from the past by creating an 
analogy between the past and the present case, d) wari', which 
functions to classify the rights, obligation, and social strata, e) sara' 
(!Jari'ah), the complementary element of the panggadakang norm which 
organises the institutions and Islamic law regulations.4(' 
Aside from the five norms above, Bugis and Makassar people 
also believe in the concept of siri' which means honor, dignity or 
courtesy. It is always identical with the value of life, which means that 
the people are ready to sacrifice everything, including their life, for the 
sake of siri' if his or her dignity has been attacked.41 Cultural norms 
such as ade', sara', and siri' bind the KPPSI alliance based on the 
philosophical slogan of taro ada' taro gau' (words and actions should be 
in accordance).42 Thereby, Islam has become a crucial aspect of South 
Sulawesi culture. 
The Enactment of Syari'ah Regional Regulations 
Responding to the demands of the KPPSI concerning the 
implementation of !Jan-'ah laws with special autonomy status in South 
Sulawesi, the provincial government formed a polling team, Balitbangda 
(the Research Body of Regional Development) and TPKPSI (the 
Team of Islamic SyarI'ah Implementation), to gather the people's 
opinions. The survey was launched on 27 January 2003 at DPRD. It 
involved 280 respondents comprising eve1y regent and mayor, all 
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implementation in their district. During the campaign period, syari'ah 
Islam issues gained a high-ranking position in the political race,53 while 
the contents of the local regulations were nothing but religious 
symbolism rather than basic needs such as solutions for poverty, 
corruption, and social justice. Seemingly, these regulations are 
frequently used by incumbent local elites to avert public attention 
from the corrupted bureaucracy and poverty issues. Together with the 
increase of syari'ah regulations, there were several corruption cases 
which implicated the office of the Bupati Bulukumba directly: a) the 
construction of Tenate market; b) the construction of an Islamic 
centre; c) corruption in the KPUD (the Local General Elections 
Commission); d) the construction of a Kajang traditional house; e) 
supplying uniform dress for civil servants in Bulukumba; f) the 
reconstruction of the Head office DPRD Bulukumba (2004-2009) 
costing 200 million; g) beras miskin program (raskin, the program of rice 
donations for poor families; h) fishing Department; and i) housing 
allowances for DPRD members.54 
In the politik aliran context, the phenomenon of SRRs is also 
interesting to analyse since the idea is strongly supported by nationalist 
parties such as Golkar and PDI-P. As discussed above, the case of 
KPPSI in South Sulawesi province epitomises the vagueness of aliran 
politics in Indonesia. The engagement of nationalist political parties 
which support the implementation of the syari'ah strengthens the 
previous analysis that the current aliran politics in Indonesia has gone 
through a big character change compared to earlier periods. 55 They 
tend to be more pragmatic than ideologic in achieving their political 
goals. The case of the formalization if ryari'ah in South Sulawesi pointis 
out that their political stance is somewhat ambivalent, since Golkar 
and PDI-P have been known to firmly oppose the implementation of 
Islamic syari'ah in NKRI. 
Above all, I have compiled a list of ryari'ah regional 
regulations in South Sulawesi and West Java from various sources. 56 In 
South Sulawesi there are 36 regional regulations/Bupati edicts 
influenced by ryan-'ah; this number does not include raperda ( draft or 
proposed legislation) influenced by ryari'ah. If these regulations are 
classified following Arskal Salim's categorization, it will distinctly show 
,vhat types of local regulations are issued most. There are fifteen 
regulations ( 42 percent) relating to religious skills and alms giving, 
such as zakah management and the ability of reciting al-Qur'an for 
students, civil servants, and couples seeking to get married. Second are 
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the regional regulations which relate to morality issues, there are 
eleven regulations (30 percent) in this category, such as prohibition of 
prostitution, sale or consumption of alcoholic drinks, and gambling. 
This is followed by the category of religious symbolism, which is 
slightly different from the categories above it. There are ten 
regulations (28 percent) which require wearing Muslim garb such as 
jilbab, peci, and bcgu koko. See figure 1 below: 
Regional Regulations Influenced by Sharia 
0 
• Regulations related 
to religious skill and 
obligation (zakat 
management, recif 
al-Our'an for
students, civil
servants, and
couples before 
getting married) 
The Rise and Fall of SRR numbeFS 
-+- Number of Shari'a Regional Regulation 
8 
Meanwhile, in the political arena, the chart above shows that 
the peak of the phenomenon was in 2005, with nine regulations, 
followed by slightly lower numbers in the next two years. In 2006 and 
2007 the number of regulations was the same, in each of them eight 
SRRs were issued. Presumably, the sharp increase during these three 
years was mainly the result of the controversy about the pornography 
draft bill in national politics. Indirectly, it helped to support the rise of 
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syari'ah implementation on the local level; the majority of the syari'ah 
regulations issued was related to religious symbols, such as wearing 
Muslim garb,jifbab, and the ability to recite al-Qur'an. Conversely, the 
issuance of syari'ah regulation had seen a significant decrease in 2004 
with only one regulation, on zaktih management; Perda no.3/2004 in 
the Barro district. The chart above shows that there were four 
regulations issued in 2003, two regulations each in 2002 and 2001, and 
none in 2000. The case of syari'ah regional regulations in the West Java 
province will be discussed in the next section. 
Syari'ah Regional Regulations in West Java: a Comparative 
Analysis 
No different from South Sulawesi, the communities in the 
West Java province are known to be deeply devout Muslims. They are 
the majority of the population in this region; the data of Litbang 
Kompas show that approximately 97 ,3 percent of the forty billion 
people in West Java are Muslim.57 Probably this is why syari'ah 
regulation has also emerged in this region, even though it is not as 
massive and organised as in South Sulawesi. It only reaches certain 
districts, and has not happened in the capital city of the province. 
The West Java province is located in the Western part of 
Indonesia; it borders with Banten and Jakarta in the North and Middle 
Java in the East. The area-of the land is 34.816,96 km2, surrounded by
mountainous lands in the Southern and central areas. sa This province 
consists of sixteen districts and nine municipalities or 25 districts and 
municipalities in total. Some of them were once the 'de facto' 
territories of the DI movement in Indonesia where the syari'ah laws 
had been applied, places such as Garut, Cianjur and Tasikmalaya. 
Therefore, it is interesting to study this case to see whether there is a 
historical link between the current syari'ah movement and the former 
DI rebellion. 
Unlike South Sulawesi, implementation of the syari'ah in this 
province has not reached the provincial level. It only reached four 
districts: Garut, Tasikmalaya, Ciajur, and Indramayu. However, it is 
important to note that the first emergence of syari'ah regulation in 
Indonesia was in this province in 2000. This means it was one year 
earlier than in South Sulawesi. Garut was the first one of the districts 
that officially issued a regulation influenced by ryari'ah in Indonesia. In 
2000, the DPRD issued the regional regulation against vice (Perda 
no.6/2000), and not long after, the Bupati issued a circular which 
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stated the requirement for female civil servants to wear jilbab on 
weekdays. The release of this local regulation gave militant Muslim 
groups the idea that they had been given the legitimation for a 
'sweeping operation' against prostitutes, which included burning 
kiosks that were suspected of being a transaction location for lelaki 
hidung belang (lady seekers).59 
On 15 January 2002 they declared Komite Penegak Syari'at Islam 
(KPSI, Committee for the Implementation of Syari'ah Islam) which 
aims to apply syari'ah regulations in Garut. This committee was led by 
K.H. Endang Yusuf who was also the leader of the Garut branch of 
the FPL In response to this, the DPRD and the local government 
founded Lembaga Pengkajian Penegakan dan Penerapan Syari'at Islam 
(LP3SI, the Implementation Body of Syari'ah Islam) on January 15, 
2002.60 The founding of LP3SI was more of a tool for political 
accommodation in order to avoid collective anarchism than a research 
institution for the formulation of syarf'ah Islam. Evidently, there has 
not been any progress since the demands for the implementation of 
syari'ah Islam were voiced on March 15, 2002 and the founding of the 
research institution (LP3SI) on 1 April 2002, with the exception of 
Perda no.1/2003 on zakdh (ahns) management. 
Another case is Cianjur, where the nuance of syari'ah 
symbolism was also very visible. Some regent candidates utilize it as a 
means of political strategy to win the hearts of Muslim voters in every 
local election. In the past two local elections, 2001 and 2006, the 
application of syan·'ah Islam has evidently been a political commodity 
in this district. Liya Yulia, the researcher of the Marhamah Society, 
claims that before the local election, the former Bupati Wasidi signed a 
political contract which stated that if he was chosen as bupati, he 
would be ready to formalise syan·'ah Islam in Cianjur. Therefore, when 
he was finally chosen as bupati, he immediately issued a Bupati edict 
that introduced the Gerbang Marhamah concept. 61 His idea about 
Gerbang Marhamah was announced during the event for the Islamic 
New Year, Muharram 1, 1422 H (March 26, 2001 ). He gave a speech 
on this topic in front of thousands of jamaah (Muslim societies) in 
Cianjur Square. However, he also emphasized that the idea of 
implementing the syari'ah does not mean creating an Islamic country, 
but it is done to fix the current decadence and immorality among 
Muslims.<>2 
Furthermore, the event brought forth an ikrar bersama 
(collective statement) of the Cianjur Muslims which was signed by 35 
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social organizations.63 The contents were similar to that of the KUI 
from Makassar, which states that !Jari'ah Islam is a worldview and the 
solution towards the multi-dimensional problems that Indonesia is 
facing, which is why they argued that the application of !Jari'ah in 
ktijfah (comprehensively) is needed in society's daily lives.64 This 
aspiration was given shape by the Bupati and DPRD by creating 
Lembaga Pengkqjian dan Pengembangan Islam (LPPI, Institute for Islamic 
Study and Development) which aims to prepare the introduction of 
Islamic !Jari'ah in Cianjur. Furthermore, the Bupati released a circular 
about the obligation for female civil servants to wear a jilbab on 
weekdays, the movement of akhlakul karimah state apparatus, and 
marhamah society in 2001.65 Along with the Bupati, the DPRD issued a 
!Jari'ah regulation on zaktih management (perda no.7 /2004). 
On 30 January 2006, the incumbent Bupati Wasidi 
renominated himself for bupati in the upcoming election. He used 
!Jari'ah symbolism to gain support from Muslim voters but lost to 
Tjejep Muhtar with a difference of 0,29 percent (309 .181 votes: 
311.802 votes).66 Based on the Nawala research, both candidates used 
the !Jari'ah Islam issue to gain support, but the incumbent Bupati 
Wasidi was believed to be too 'soft' on Christians because he allowed 
the building of a new church in the Gereja Lembah Karmel area.67 
Although Wasidi Swastomo was the undeniable pioneer for 
f�rmalising !Jari'ah regulation in Cianjur, the religious sentiment in 
society was too strong, especially regarding the issues of the new 
churchy and the deviating Islamic sects, such as the case of the 
Ahmadiyah which occurred one year before the election, on 19 
September 2005.68 
Not too different from the former Bupati, the newly chosen 
Bupati Tjetjep Muhtar Sholeh also supported the release of local 
regulations on Gerbang Marhamah. As a result, on July 20, 2006 the 
DPRD formalised it with by issuing Perda no.3/2006.69 Following this 
decision, Tjetjep Muhtar Sholeh released two regulations to implement 
the first regulation. First was circular no.15 /2006 about official civil 
servant uniforms, second Bupati's instruction no.2/2007 regarding the 
billboard which displays the vision and mission of Cianjur district and 
the application program of reciting al-Qur'an.7(' 
Formalisation of the !Jari'ah also took place in Tasikmalaya, a 
region known as kota santri (Muslim City). Like the regions mentioned 
earlier, Tasikmalaya was also busy creating a Rencana Strategis (Renstra, 
strategic plan) appropriate for PP no.108/2000.71 Regarding this issue, 
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Muslim political groups proposed for the Renstra to contain some 
Islamic nuance. Though some politicians did not agree with this idea 
they did not speak out openly, afraid to lose their political position 
because the Islamic sentiment in this district is very high within this 
social structure. Referring to Amin Mudzakir's research, since the fall 
of Soeharto the PPP has become the dominant party in this district. 
This is why those who do not support their syari'ah Islam vision in the 
Renstra would be accused of being un-Islamic, not santri and even anti­
Islam.72 After an intense debate, in the end Perda no.13 /2003 which 
states 'Tasikmalaya is a leading Islamic district which is prosperous 
and competitive in agribusiness 2010' was released. Prior to this, 
former Bupati Tatang Farhanil Hakim released circular no. 
451/SE/sos/2001 urging society to follow the syari'ah in their daily 
lives. 
The Bupati edict was also supported by the 'ajengan bendo' 
( 'u/amd' group). They were juru dakwah (Islamic transmitters) who were 
critical of Soeharto's policies and gained public sympathy during the 
Tasikmalaya riot in 1996. Some of them were affiliated with Islamic 
parties and hardliner Islamic groups such as the FPI, Laskar Taliban, 
and GPI (Islamic Youth Movement). They often used circulars and 
Tasikmalaya's vision of becoming an Islamic santri city to legitimate 
their violent activities under the banner of Islam, such as prostitution 
raids and arresting alcohol sellers, and their anti-vice movement. One 
day they mistakenly arrested a woman who was walking alone at night 
and they immediately shaved her head because she was without her 
muhrim (close relative). In fact, the reason why she walked alone at 
night was because of the public transportation strike.73 
Furthermore, in November 2002, Bupati Irianto MS 
Syaifuddin (Yance) announced that he would apply the syari'ah in 
Indramayu. He announced this during the celebration of Indramayu's 
475th anniversary. The idea of implementing syari'ah was initially 
inspired by the increase in poverty, criminality, and prostitution.74 As 
an early move, Bupati Yance obligated female civil servants to wear a 
ji/bab and the males to wear a bqju koko every Friday. Before beginning 
work, the workers must also read al-Qur'an and fast Senin-Kamis 
(Monday and Thursday).75 
In the local elections in 2005, the incumbent Bupati Yance 
came back to use religious sentiment to win the political race. He 
distributed thousands of Qur'ans with his picture and a paragraph 
about his vision and mission in several mosques and pesantren (Islamic 
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boarding schools). Despite the fact that his political action was 
criticized by the Independent Election Monitoring Team and K.H. 
Addib Rafi'uddin Izza (Rais Syuriah PBNU originally from 
Indramayu) because he had defiled the Holy book of al-Qur'an, he still 
won the local elections for 2005-2010.76 
Between DI Links and Political Commodity 
The West Java province was known as the centre of the 
DI/TII movement. Under the leadership of Kartosoewirjo this 
movement had spread widely to the regions of Java, Aceh, South 
Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. He opposed the central government 
for approximately thirteen years. Rebellionhas occurred frequently in 
the history of this province, especially rebellions based onreligious 
sentiments such as the Cianjur-Sukabumi incident on 22 September 
1885 about the Tarekat Naq.ryabandryah movement, which opposed the 
Dutch colonial government; and Patih Sukabumi,77 the rebellion of 
Banten farmers which involved a number of religious leaders, kyai and 
hqji, on 9-30 July 1888;78 and the resistance movement of Haji Hasan 
group in Leles (Garut) which was exterminated by the Dutch colonial 
government on July 7, 1919. 
Historically, Islam came to West Java in 1470 M, which means 
135 years before it arrived in South Sulawesi (1605 M). It was spread 
by Syarif Hidayat who was. known as Syarif Hidayatullah or Sunan 
Gunung Jati. According to the story of Purwaka Camban Nagari, Syarif 
Hidayat was the son of Maulana Sultan Muhammad from the Arab 
world and Nyi Lara Santang, Prabu Siliwangi's daughter from the 
Padjajaran Kingdom. Before arriving in Cirebon, Syarif Hidayat 
introduced himself and taught Sunan Ampel (Sqyyid Rahmat) how to 
preach Islam in Pasundan land.79 Since that time Islam is widely 
known among Sundanese people and they are considered to be 
religious Muslims. A report of the Residen Priangan Ooshout 
successor ( on 4 November 1907) states that 'Sundanese people are 
more religious than Javanese, which is why the government has to be 
careful in permitting Arabs to journey to this region.'&J 
Therefore, it is understandable that the idea of implementing 
the ryari'ah has always had a place in West Javanese society. Fifty years 
ago, Kartosoewirjo (1905-1962) applied ryari'ah Islam in the 'de facto' 
DI territories of this province. Some scholars commented that the 
Islamic symbolisation that Kartosoewirjo used was only a political 
strategy to gain the support and sympathy of the Sundanese people. 
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The emergence of the DI movement was triggered by his 
dissatisfaction with the Renville agreement which did not involve him 
in bringing the territorial authority of West Java back under control.81 
Therefore, the Islamic sentiment was only used as a political tool. This 
rebellion occured from 1948-1962, and he was finally arrested in 
Mount Geber Majalaya, West Java, and was sentenced to death on 
Soekarno's order on September 5, 1962.82 
Furthermore, Kartosoewirjo's idea was revived by former 
DI/TII members. They formed a number of Regional Commandos 
that were scattered throughout several regions as discussed earlier. 
They still fight for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. 
Some fight constitutionally, whereas some choose to work 
underground. As it happens, the region that currently applies syari'ah 
regulations used to be part of the de facto DI/TII territories such as 
Garut, Cianjur, and Tasikmalaya. In Cianjur the survival of the syari'ah­
movement was once linked with NII KW-9 (NII Commandment 
Region IX) whose historical link was to DI and Pondok Pesantren al­
Zaitun.83 However, this connection was immediately rejected by bupati 
Wasidi. Cited from an interview between him and Kiblat Umat site, the 
Bupati stated that the implementation of syan-'ah Islam with the 
Gerbang Marhamah was not a movement that wanted to create an 
Islamic state, but was meant as a 'middle way' which accommodated 
the aspirations- of the Muslim majority of Cianjur in the NKRI 
corridor. 84 
However, the idea of the Bupati was also used by Abu Toto 
(the leader of KW 9). Like the KPPSI South Sulawesi movement, the 
NII KW 9 requested that the Bupati and DPRD immediately issue the 
syan-'ah regulation, particularly on the requirement to wear the jilbab.85 
The NII KW 9 and KPPSI are somewhat similar, the only difference 
being that the number of actors here was not as massive and 
organized as KPPSI in South Sulawesi and was more reactive than 
proactive. 
In Tasikmalaya, the application of syari'ah regulation after the 
reformation era was strongly affected by the historical memory of the 
DI/TII. The proponents of the syari'ah movement reinterpreted the 
DI/TII history with the new version. They argued that DI/TII is one 
of the historical proofs of how deeply rooted Islamic politics are in 
this region.86 However, they were systematically stigmatized by the 
government during the New Order era. They claimed that Soeharto 
intended to eliminate the spirit of Muslim politics in order to maintain 
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his position.87 The historical reinterpretation appeared together with 
the demand for the reinsertion of the Jakarta Charter by the PBB and 
the PPP in the Annual Session of the MPR. In the 1999 and 2004 
general elections, the PPP became a dominant party in this district. 
The victory of this party meant their cadres gained seats in the DPRD. 
It was from with people that the idea of implementing syari'ah 
appeared in the local government, especially since it was together with 
the issue of the reinclusion of the Jakarta Charter. 
In this political climate, the syari'ah became a promising 
political commodity for Bupati candidates during the Tasikamalaya 
Bupati election of 2001. As discussed above, Bupati Wasidi created a 
political contract with PPP, GPI, Brigade Taliban, and FPI which 
stated his commitment to apply regional syari'ah laws in Cianjur if he 
would be chosen.88 This is important to note because at that time the 
Bupati was still selected by DPRD, not chosen through direct 
democracy. Presumably this political context was what made Bupati 
Wasidi interested in signing the 'political contract,' considering the 
large number of DPRD members coming from a position of Muslim 
formalism. 
Aside from Tasikmalaya and Cianjur, Garut was also a region 
which was heavy with religious sentiment and the history of the 
Islamic movement. In 1919 K.H. Hasan Arief (a leading figure of 
Syarikat Islam) led a rebellion; they refused to transport the harvest to 
the Dutch Colonial Government. This incident was known as the 
Cimareme movement.89 Later on during the Japanese occupation a 
sufah institute in Garut which was originally intended to provide 
religious education was changed into a centre for paramilitary training 
for Muslim youth (Hizbullah and Sabilillah).90 Some scholars argue that 
this was the growth of the DI/TII seed. In the following periods, 
Kartosoewirjo turned Malangbong-Garut into centre of Islamic syari'ah 
activities and application.91 He founded a press to print important 
documents for the DI/TII movement.92 
Indirectly Kartosoewirjo's Islamic movement handed down 
the spirit of a formalist and ideologist Islam within Garut 
communities, such as what is told about Islamic figures in the 
Wanaraja and Karangpawitan sub districts in Garut. They are still 
impressed with Kartosoewirjo and honor him as a true Muslim leader. 
They consider the recent Muslim leaders to be opportunists who do 
not fight for Islam.93 
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Their admiration notwithstanding, the current syari'ah 
formalism in Garut district is, theoretically speaking, far from the 
social movement category because their actions appear to be 
unorganized and subject to merely short periods of interest. 
Khoirunnisa's field research data demonstrate that the idea of 
implementing syari'ah is only discussed amongst the elites, since 85 
percent of the common people do not understand what formalisation 
of the syan-'ah means.94 So far, they understand syan-'ah to be an act of 
religious rituality that they have been accustomed to conducting in 
their daily lives, such as praying, fasting and zakdh, which is more 
flexible than the formalist understanding. In comparison, the number 
of local regulations which have been issued in West Java is not as high 
as that in South Sulawesi, even though they were the pioneers of 
formalising syari'ah regulation. Up to the present day (2008) there are 
only ten syari'ah regulations in West Java; four regulations related to 
morality, four regulations related to religious symbolism, and only two 
regulations related to syari'ah compulsories. 
Closing Remarks 
The idea of syari'ah formalisation has emerged since the early 
days of Indonesian modem history. From the previous times Muslim 
politics always demanded that the state formalise the Islamic laws in 
the country, but they failed repeatedly. During the Old Order-period, 
the concept of the Jakarta Charter became the topic of a lengthy 
controversial debate between Nationalist and Muslim groups. During 
the New Order period, demands of syari'ah implementation were never 
heard, but this did not mean that the aspirations had disappeared. 
Markedly, a number of Islamic parties have reemerged since the 
collapse of the New Order. The PPP and the PBB have even officially 
called for the re-inclusion of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter in 
2001 and 2002, but failed in their attempts. 
Lately syan-'ah formalisation has proliferated widely in local 
governments, including those in South Sulawesi and the West Java 
province. As discussed earlier, these two provinces have a long history 
in dealing with the implementation of the syari'ah. The majority of 
both populations are devout Muslims, but they have different cultural 
characteristics. In the 1955 elections the Islamic parties dominatedin 
these two regions, but since the fusion of Islamic political parties in 
1973, the Muslim vote became fragmented and Muslims also affiliated 
with the nationalist parties. It may be that the idea of applying syari'ah 
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in local districts, put forth by nationalist parties such as Golkar and 
PD I-P in South Sulawesi, can be traced back to this period. This 
phenomenon shows how drastic the shift of political ideology in 
Indonesia is, where throughout the Old and New Order eras those 
political parties were not interested in using Islamic issues. 
In conclusion, the actors of Islamic formalisation in these two 
provinces can be divided into two categories; formal and informal 
institutions. In South Sulawesi the formal actors are comprised of a 
Governor, Bupati/ Walikota, and all of the DPRD province members. 
The informal actors come from the Islamic organizations that were 
involved in the KPPSI alliance. Both types of actors jointly demanded 
that the central government give a special autonomy status to South 
Sulawesi in implementing the syari'ah. Notwithstanding the fact that 
their demands were denied, most of the districts have officially issued 
syari'ah regulations (36 SRRs in total), including the provincial 
government. Looking at this kind of organisation and the involvement 
of a number of former DI members, it can be concluded that 
culturally the KPPSI has a link to the former DI, but not structurally. 
In West Java, the application of syari'ah only succeeded in four 
out of twenty-five districts, namely Garut, Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, and 
Indramayu (in total there are ten syari'ah regulations in these districts). 
In general the formal actors of these districts only consist of the 
Bupati and the PPP frat:tion in- the DPRD. This is considerably 
different from South Sulawesi where it was fully supported by all 
members of the legislative and executive branches of the government. 
In addition, the informal actors also did not appear as organized as the 
KPPSI in South Sulawesi. They are manifested in various 
organizations such as FPI, NII KW 9, KPSI, LPPI, GPI, and Laskar 
Taliban. In many cases, the local elites use the syari'ah issues to win the 
hearts of Muslim voters in local election events. In those moments, 
the rise of syari'ah implementation tends to be closer to a political 
commodity than the D'a·ri'ah movement which was linked to the 
former DI movement. 
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